





Using Experiments to Discover Cyclic Causal Structures with Latent Variables

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

Causal & Statistical Inference



- Conditions for causal discovery
- Learning from experimental data
 - Algorithms
 - Different types of experimental interventions
- Optimal sequences of experiments
 - Normative: analyzing discovery strategies
 - Descriptive: causal learning in humans and animals
- Impact of fundamental and methodological assumptions





Causal Discovery





Sachs et al. (2005)



Signaling Network



Signaling Network




Model Assumptions




~~Acyclicity~~
~~Causal Sufficiency~~




Experimental Interventions



- Determines causal order
- Breaks confounding
- Confounding due to latent variables





Latent Variables



Using only independence and dependence constraints, these two graphs are indistinguishable by *any* sequence of experiments involving single (or no) interventions per experiment.




$X_1 \perp\!\!\!\perp X_3 \mid \{set(X_1), set(X_2)\}$ vs. $X_1 \perp\!\!\!\perp X_3 \mid \{set(X_1), set(X_2)\}$

Given only Independence Constraints...






- In the worst case N experiments, each intervening on up to $N-1$ variables are necessary to discover the causal structure.

Linearity






$$X_i = \sum_{X_j \in pa(X_i)} k_j X_j + e_i$$

Linearity






covariance	X1	X2	X3
X1			0
X2			0
X3			1

Linearity






covariance	X1	X2	X3
X1		0	0
X2		1	0
X3		c	1

Linearity



covariance	X1	X2	X3
X1	1	0	0
X2	a	1	0
X3	ac+b vs. ac	c	1

Linear Model



$$\dot{x}_{t+1} = B\dot{x}_t + \dot{e}$$



$$\dot{e} \sim N(0, \Sigma)$$

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ a & 0 & 0 \\ b & c & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$\Sigma = \begin{pmatrix} e1 & 0 & \beta \\ 0 & e2 & \gamma \\ \beta & \gamma & e3 \end{pmatrix}$$

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ a & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & c & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

Inference



$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{x}_{t+1}^v &= B\mathbf{x}_t^v + \mathbf{e}^v \\ \mathbf{e}^v &\sim N(\mathbf{0}, \Sigma) \end{aligned}$$


$$B = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ a & 0 & 0 \\ b & c & 0 \end{pmatrix} \quad A = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 \\ a & 1 & 0 \\ ac+b & c & 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

Total effect to direct effect: $(I - B)^{-1} = A$

Covariance in terms of correlated errors:




$$\begin{aligned} C_x &= E(xx^t) = E(Aee^t A^t) \\ &= A\Sigma A^t \end{aligned}$$

Algorithm




- For each intervention on X_i , compute the total effect of X_i on every other variable (i.e. fill column i of total effect matrix A)
- Given A , compute $B = I - A^{-1}$
- Determine the passive observational covariance matrix C_x
- Determine the error covariance matrix $\Sigma = A^{-1}C_x(A^t)^{-1}$
- ➔ Structure among observed variables and location of latent variables


Cyclic Models



Cyclic Models






$$B = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & b \\ a & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & c & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$






Equilibrium Guarantee: $|eigen\lambda(B)| < 1$


Cycles



Cycles




Algorithm




- For each intervention on X_i , compute the total effect of X_i on every other variable (i.e. fill column i of total effect matrix A)
 - Given A , compute $B = I - A^{-1}$
 - Determine the passive observational covariance matrix C_x
 - Determine the error covariance matrix Σ as a function of C_x and B .
- ➔ Structure among observed variables and location of latent variables


Example




Ground Truth




Estimated Model




Simulation




Acyclic Stochastic B



Cyclic Stochastic B




Results




- Given an experimental intervention on each of a set of variables, and assuming the causal relations are linear, we can determine
 - The exact causal connection among the intervened variables
 - Presence and location of unmeasured common causes
 - for a large variety of acyclic and cyclic models
 - with stochastic or deterministic causal relations


Other Types of Interventions




Multiple Simultaneous Interventions




Soft Interventions / Instrumental Variables




Weakening Linearity



- Compositionality
 - Trek computation




Bigger Picture



○ Optimal Sequences of Experiments


- Different types of interventions
- Different types of assumptions
- Algorithms that combine results from different experiments
- [trading off discovery and its cost]

Collaborators







- Patrik Hoyer (University of Helsinki)
- Richard Scheines (Carnegie Mellon University)

Thank you!




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Self Loops




Bounds for Independence Constraints



Interventions per experiment	Strength of Intervention	Number of experiments	
		No Latents	Latents
Single	Hard	$N-1$	impossible
Single	Soft	$N-1$	impossible
Multiple	Hard	$\log_2(N)+1$	N
Multiple	Soft	$1!!$	impossible


Bounds for Linear Models



Bonus:
Presence and location of latent variables and structure among latent variables can be discovered.

Intervention per experiment		Number of experiments	
		Latents	Latents
Single	Hard	$N-1$	impossible
Single	Soft	$N-1$	impossible
Multiple	Hard	$\log_2(N)+1$	$< 2\log_2(N)$
Multiple	Soft	1	impossible

Bridge Principles




Statistical Properties


$$P(X, Y, Z)$$




X	Y	Z
-1.01	-0.71	5.18
-0.85	0.16	-3.31
0.11	-0.59	-1.00
0.20	1.47	-3.21
...



Causal Structure



Causal Markov Condition



Each causal variable is independent of its non-descendants given its causes.


Probability

- Probabilistic Dependence
- Probabilistic Independence




Causality

- Causal Connection
- Causal Separation




Causal Faithfulness Condition



All the independence relations in the probability distribution are due to the Markov condition.

Probability


- Probabilistic Dependence
- Probabilistic Independence



Causality

- Causal Connection
- Causal Separation




Using Markov and Faithfulness



Statistical Properties




Causal Structure



$$P(Y)P(X|Y)P(Z|X)$$

Underdetermination



Statistical Properties


$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$
 $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$
 $Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$
 $Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid X$




Equivalence Classes




Intervention and Discovery (2)




- One at a time
- Multiple Simultaneously










Example with 3 Variables



Truth
(unknown)




$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$	$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y \mid Z$
$X \not\perp\!\!\!\perp Z$	$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid Y$
$Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$	$Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z \mid X$




Another intervention is needed to uniquely identify the true structure!


Example with 3 Variables





Truth
(unknown)



$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$	$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y Z$
$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$	$X \perp\!\!\!\perp Z Y$
$Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$	$Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z X$



But we could have been lucky...




- $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y$
- $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$
- $Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z$

- $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Y | Z$
- $X \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | Y$
- $Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z | X$

- Intervention on X


Worst Case Sequences



Interventions per Experiment	Worst case number of experiments
Single	$N-1$ (for $N>2$; 2 if $N=2$)
Multiple	$\log_2(N) + 1$ (for $N>2$; 2 for $N=2$)

- Worst case is not representative
- What about the expected case?
 - Expected case depends on distribution of possible hypotheses
 - Use an uninformative distribution (?) – flat?


Discovery and its cost



- Some experiments might be impossible or unethical
- Some experiments might be more expensive than others
- Collecting data passively observationally may be cheap, while experimental data is expensive

→ **Cost Functions**


Discovery as a Game against Nature





- Sequences of experiments as strategies in a sequential game
- Cost functions represented in the pay-off structure
- Optimal trade-off between discovery and its cost is solution to the game
- Expected result of a strategy can be characterized as the expected outcome of a rational response to an opponent (Nature) in a game.





Three Different Strategies



Fixed Strategy:




Adaptive Strategy:




Mixed Strategy:

Ex1: K where K is sampled from $\{X, Y, Z\}$ with $1/3$.
If resolved, no further experiment,
otherwise Ex2: M where M is sampled with $1/2$ from $\{X, Y, Z\} \setminus \{K\}$





Rules of the Game




- Two player (Nature & Scientist) zero-sum game
- Nature chooses the true graph
- Scientist chooses and performs experiments
- Independence relations true in the manipulated distribution are revealed in each experiment
- Nature may not change true graph after initial setting
- Pay-off to Nature is the number of experiments that are performed
- Scientist may end game at any point by announcing a graph. If it is false, the loss is infinity.

Game with 2 Variables




Analyzing the Game




- 2-person zero-sum game implies that the Nash equilibrium corresponds to the mini-max solution
- ➔ Nash equilibrium identifies cost of optimal strategy when Nature is an adversarial opponent
- ➔ Nash equilibrium specifies distribution over structures that is most costly to learn
- ➔ Nash equilibrium describes a sequence of experiments that is globally optimal

Results for Games




- For single (or no) interventions per experiment:
 - $N=2$: $\max(E(\#\text{exp})) = 5/3$
 - $N=3$: $\max(E(\#\text{exp})) = 2 = N-1!!!$
 - $N>3$: $\max(E(\#\text{exp})) = 2/3 N - 1/3$
- Nature's distribution: uniform over **complete** structures
- Scientist's strategy: uniform sampling (without replacement) of variables for intervention

Nature's distribution over structures






- The most costly discovery problem occurs when Nature samples from a distribution that is uniform over complete causal structures.




- This is not the “uninformative” distribution over all possible causal structures.
- Once multiple simultaneous interventions are permitted in one experiment, even the above no longer holds.

Multiple Simultaneous Interventions per Experiment



Results for Strategies




Theorem 1: No adaptive search strategy is better than a static strategy for the worst case expectation.

Theorem 2: Adaptive strategies are better than static strategies in expectation for most distributions over graphs.

Theorem 3: There is a mixed strategy that strictly dominates any static or adaptive strategy in expectation, but only for $N > 3$ variables.


...

Many open problems...



- Robustness of search strategies
 - off-equilibrium play by Nature
- Is nature an adversarial opponent?
 - If not, we can now analyze the game accordingly, without an a priori commitment to a particular distribution over structures
- Changing the rules of the game
 - Perhaps Nature is not the “constant gardener”
- Change the cost functions
 - Experiments with different costs
 - Cost per sample, etc.


Bigger Problems



- Analyzing the “cost” of an assumption
 - What effect does the assumption of acyclicity have?
- Representing large games

Strategy / Structure		→ X	→ X	→ Y	...
		→ Y	→ Z	→ Z	
Super-exponential in N	X Y				
	X → Y		> Factorial in N		
	X ← Y				

On the shoulders of...



- Abraham Wald (1902 – 1950)
- *Statistical Decision Functions* (1950)
- Here: Extension of Wald's framework to sequences of experiments.

